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Introduction 
After the election of Barack Obama as US president in 2008, Glenn Beck emerged as 
a powerful populist demagogue and leader of the Tea Party from the pulpit of Fox . A 
cross between Network’s Howard Beale, Father Caughlin and Oprah, Beck was not 
simply another right-wing populist pundit whose outrage reset with each news cycle. 
Rather he engaged in seeming revolutionary exposition in consecrating a populist 
community across media space, unified by a transgressive dehumanization of its 
enemy. It’s hard to overstate the radical break from convention presented by Beck 
as the programme ranged from deep apocalypticism to the warmth of a prayer 
meeting. Beck’s shtick was the befuddled everyman who, reacting to a crisis-stricken 
America, is emotionally wracked by the burden of being the messenger of this 
reality. Delivering 20-minute monologues about the global caliphate or communists 
in the academy, Beck manoeuvres between fear, anger, sarcasm, intellectualism and 
tranquillity, while gesticulating or crying. Tears are Beck’s affective currency, not 
simply because they are good television but in the affective solicitation to the 
populist fetish of the Tea Party.  
 
This article looks at the Glenn Beck Program as an example of affective media 
production. In a media environment where cats, self-expressive modes of discourse 
and “inspirational response to bully” videos drive media consumption and internet 
traffic, affect functions as a central political and economic logic. The principle 
economic logic is the audience commodity performing affective labour. Beck’s 
viewers produce the spectacle of Tea Party protest for Fox and consume Beck’s 
program, reading list and end-times commodities as part of revolutionary 
preparedness (Author 2013). This is simultaneously a question of political ontology 
as affective media draws us into social and libidinal circuits of desire. Accounts of 
affective labour and media produsage bear the traces of Hardt and Negri’s teleology 
of the multitude: the social nature of affective media production eludes capitalist 
control and opens new spaces for radical democracy. Beck and the Tea Party 
problematize humanist assumptions of such affective labour theory. Instead of the 
emancipatory multitude, populism is insular and fetishistic 
 
Beck’s ability to unite Tea Party members as an audience community rests upon his 
affective invitation to the populist lifeworld. The unhinged emotional range and 
appeal to the Tea Party signifier functions as an affective solicitation connected to 
the viewers’ own inner libidinal investments. Beck’s audience defines the populist 
political logic of ‘affective investment in a partial object’ (Laclau 2005, 116): the 
signifier “Tea Party” becomes a placeholder for republican virtue, free-market 
capitalism and Christianity (Author 2012). This partial object, or objet petit a, is the 
basis for a Tea Party hegemonic chain of equivalence dividing the social space 
between a people and its enemy. This affective investment takes a properly fetishistic 
turn (Žižek 2008) by constructing the people’s enemy. The enemy is overdetermined 
by contradictory evils projected upon it, necessary for experiencing  an obscene 
jouissance in participating in the movement.  
 
This article identifies the political, economic and libidinal logic of affective media 
before turning to an analysis of Beck’s affective performance at the level of text. 
Beck personally embodies the turmoil of the populist dichotomy; whether in 
viciously dehumanizing the enemy or consecrating his community in warmth and 
reciprocity. The “9-12” project launched on his program shifts seamlessly from 
innumerable threats to the audience’s self-realization as universal agents of American 
history. Beck and his audience share tears, jokes and affirmations as if in group 
therapy. From this sanctum of affective fraternity, the enemy becomes an obsessive 
object of study, forever threatening the people’s jouissance through their own 
rapacious enjoyment. The enemy is constructed in anti-Semitic terms, omnipotent 
yet overcome by carnal desires, from George Soros’ addiction to financial 
manipulation, Barack Obama’s college transgressions and the unrestrained avarice of 
the urban poor.  
 
Where Beck’s affective media production threatens a real critical media politics is in 
his explicit claim to the universal. The obscene jouissance of obsessively ridiculing 
the enemy is framed in the highest values of journalistic rationalism and “truth-
telling”. Beck’s audience have exclusive access to critical “truth,” making them 
‘people of a special mould…[as the] direct embodiment of the will of history’ (Žižek 
1991, 252). It’s the emancipatory promise of populist exceptionalism that informs 
Beck’s pseudo-intellectual apparatus of chalkboard expositions, book-hawking and 
the Beck University lecture series. The apogee of this affective media logic is Beck’s 
role as ‘Parrhesiaste’ (Foucault 2001), that is, speaking truth to power despite 
danger. The emotional work of affective investment becomes wedded to universal 
truth. Beck’s populist authenticity, inner turmoil and belief that Soros is trying to kill 
him all function as validity claims. Affective media production’s ability to engender 
collaboration is premised upon investment in the fetish and seeming critical media 
practices which entail the incessant ‘epistemological drive’ (Lacan 2007, 105) to 
understand the Other’s depravity. Affective media’s social logic thus doesn’t produce 
emancipatory politics, instead a populism that claims radical discourses of 
horizontalism and truth-telling against the fetishized enemy. 
 
Affective Media Production 
 “Affective media production” borrows from Hardt and Negri who identify affective 
and immaterial forms of labour as increasingly hegemonic in all spheres of 
production. My variant of the affective labour thesis limits itself to identifying the 
centrality of mediatized forms of affect to the fields of journalism and media as a 
political economic logic. Where Hardt and Negri speak of the general condition of 
capital to harness ‘networks based on communication, collaboration and affective 
relationships’ (66) my concern focusses on media production. While arguments can 
be made about the extent to which the exploitation of affective labour in service 
industries represents a new reality of capital, media production and consumption has 
demonstrably changed. Journalism and news media have always relied upon the 
‘affective encounter of bodies across space’ (Massumi in Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 
xvi), but journalistic ideals of self-reflexivity and rationalism have been superseded by 
affective validation. The emergence of mobile devices as the new terrain for market 
expansion has transformed “traditional” content and practices to reflect the affective 
character of social media, in the pursuit of ‘free labour’ (Terranova 2004) from 
audiences and users. Affective solicitation is not simply a strategy of keeping pace 
with new media practices, or enticing users with “clickbait”, it represents the 
perfection of the media’s model of audience commodification. In what Fuchs 
designates the calls ‘prosumer audience commodity’ (2012), users voluntarily 
surrender their personal preferences and intimate details opening the potential for 
‘infinite exploitation’ (714) in social and productive spheres. 
 
Beck’s program performed exactly this function for Fox, cementing the network’s 
brand strategy of ‘craft[ing] intensive relationships with their viewers’ (Jones 2012, 
180). Beck connected the network to the far-flung libertarian, Bircher and militia 
strains of the Republican grassroots. In aiding, promoting and even staging Tea Party 
events, Fox reinforces its brand community, engendering a loyal and active audience 
whose free labour creates the very spectacle of protest Fox covers. These viewers 
do not merely follow Fox as a trusted media source but as an authentic voice in the 
populist struggle. It’s this authenticity that allows Beck to sell gold, home security 
systems, and other “end-times” commodities as an extension of the movement. This 
is affective prosumption in the sense that it relies upon a broader ‘sense of 
connection and participation in something that is larger than one’s self…provid[ing] 
the impetus for exploring new techniques and practices of communication and 
affective productions’ (Cote and Pybus 2007, 96). The indeterminate moralistic Tea 
Party cry of “Take Back Our Country!” elicits an affective drive of Fox viewers to fill 
the signifier “Tea Party”. This affective labour should not be thought of as a priori 
controlled by media corporations as some of these energies may exceed Fox’s remit1. 
Indeed, Beck himself was released by Fox over his monopolization of this free labour 
putting him in conflict with management and traditional advertisers, while also 
leading to an increasingly deluded political voice, even by his standards.  
 
The affective labour thesis, as conceived by autonomist Marxists (Hardt and Negri 
2004, Terranova 2004) and libertarian cyber-utopians (Coleman 2014, Benkler 
2006), has primarily sought to identify new emancipatory modes of politics emerging 
through affective media labour. There has been a great deal of excitement in the 
emergence of Occupy Wall Street and the Arab Spring, but little consideration of 
how a phenomenon like Beck embodies affective labour and its discourse of social 
transformation. The key metaphor here is ‘the rhizome’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 
7) where politics is dispersed with no central locus as a flow between bodies with 
‘no beginning or end’ (ibid, 27). In affective media theory, networked 
communications are deemed rhizomatic ‘upend[ing] the ideological divide between 
individualism and collectivism’ (Coleman, 2014, p. 49-50). While Hardt and Negri 
have a theory of labour exploitation they channel the teleologies of Classical 
Marxism in claiming that affective labour transcends its capture by capital. For 
affective networks to function there must be creative autonomy from the 
‘mechanisms of control [that] contradict the productivity of biopolitical labour’ 
(2009, 144). Conceived in this way, there is an inability to see radical illiberalism as a 
genuine product of affective media or be contained within circuits of capital. 
 
While the affective passions of Beck’s audience were too unruly for Fox, they did not 
supersede capital as Beck transformed this audience into an empire2 . Where 
Deleuzian affective labour theory posits connectivity as innately critical, Dean’s 
Lacanian Marxist reading of new media subjectivities is of neoliberal individuation and 
‘community without community’ (2010a, 22). Whatever critical potential exists, 
affective media produces a notion of social transformation analogous to its own 
logic. Once, Beck unwittingly channelled Deleuze and deterritorialization, entreating 
his audience ‘to spit yourself out of the system, you’ve got to be nomadic, un-flagged’ 
(Fox  2010). The task thus is to theorize affect as a political logic rather than rely 
upon a humanism with no theory of rupture outside of ‘people’s natural and healthy 
propensity to revolt’ (Laclau, 243). 
 
Affect and the Political 
The political subject of affective media is not the rational humanist ideal supposed by 
Hardt and Negri and others, but the psychoanalytic subject of drives and libidinal 
investments. Political rupture is not born simply of connectivity and sociality but the 
libidinal rewards of political identity. Our incessant interactions in and through 
affective media function as a Lacanian drive that is ‘a closed circular 
movement…[which] generates its own satisfaction’ (Žižek 2014 412). Affective 
encounters accordingly bind users in circuits of capital and drive to ‘extend affective 
networks without encouraging – and indeed, by displacing – their consolidation into 
organized political networks’ (Dean 2010a, 42). Where these conditions of affective 
media production extend beyond insular drive is in the Lacanian logic of desire. This 
is precisely how the signifier “Tea Party” functions as a nodal point of ‘affective 
investment’ (Laclau 116) which represents an America reconciled in free-market 
capitalism, republican virtue, frontier fecundity, the second amendment and 
Christianity (Author 2012). Enjoyment and the pleasures of affective media must be 
understood in terms of unfulfilled desire, whether the ceaseless joys of interactivity 
and increasing one’s reach, to the anxiety over miscommunication or the unliked 
post. In the Tea Party, there is a convergence of affective energies from the 
mediatized sense of participating in “something” with that something the incessant 
drive for the lost object: a primordial American frontier capitalism.  
 
At this stage it’s import to distinguish between Deleuzian affect theory and Lacanian 
Marxism, ie,; anti-Oedipus versus symbolic castration. The distinction is between a 
phenomenological understanding of affective connectivity—seen as politically 
productive in its own right—or antagonism as an ontologically-necessary 
precondition for political identity. For Deleuzians ‘desire is open, drifting, expanding, 
productive’	   (Žižek 2014, 412) with affects generated in this circulation. This is 
captured in Ahmed’s notion of affective economies where ‘the accumulation of 
affective values shapes the surfaces of bodies and worlds’ (Ahmed 2004, 121). Affect 
here is a social contagion uniting bodies and dormant communities from the 
‘outside-in’ (Ahmed 2010, 36). Deleuzian affect explicitly rejects the intra-psychic 
aspects of desire as affects are between bodies and ‘if there is backward movement 
it’s not to Oedipus and its threat to castration’ (Clough 2008, 4). This contrasts 
sharply with the inter-subjective dynamics of Lacanian enjoyment where one is 
wracked by the presence of an other. The key distinction between here is between 
an affective economy which is productive and Lacanian Marxism’s surplus enjoyment 
where there is always excess. Affective labour and its exploitation depends upon 
unfulfilled desire, the other threatening our desire and the fundamental lack of 
symbolic castration making desire possible.  
 
The political encounter of others in affective media is not determined by affects 
themselves but the internal element of antagonism which is constitutive of political 
identity. At work is the oedipal logic of populism. The populist community are 
constituted by libidinal bonds with the signifier “The People” representing an 
imagined organic whole analogous to the primordial mother/child relationship. This 
signifier functions as Lacan’s objet petit a, promising the ‘absent fullness of society’ 
(Laclau, 226). As the fully-reconciled society of the Tea Party cannot be fulfilled, an 
“other” (Obama) always displaces this fulfilment. Thus the investment in the object 
denotes an antagonistic division of the social space as the basis for political identity 
(Mouffe, 15). Laclau and Mouffe hold that this affective identity is nominal, doesn’t 
privilege any particular social actor and bears indeterminate political content. Thus, 
this affective investment is fleeting with eruptions of the political perpetually 
dislodging and dissolving identities.  
 
On the question of affective media production and the political, Laclau’s populism 
offers contingency and antagonism as a requiem to humanist teleologies. What is 
problematic in the formulation of populism is what Žižek calls the fetishistic--‘proto-
fascist’--logic (2006, 553) and the necessary ideological obfuscation of capitalism 
inherent in populism. The Tea Party fetish allows the community to disavow the 
crisis of capitalism with ‘I know but nevertheless…’ (Žižek 1991, 245). They can 
sustain their fetishistic belief in free-market capitalism by displacing the crisis onto 
parasitic agents, such as Obama, Soros and central bankers, who must be destroyed 
in to ‘restore balance and justice’ (Žižek 2008, 278). For Žižek the fetishistic defence 
of identity has an unavoidable trajectory towards fascism, the enemy occupying the 
same spectral presence as the Jew in Nazism (2006, 556). Laclau and Mouffe can 
theorize affect and the political far more satisfactorily than Hardt and Negri, yet they 
fail to account for the stubbornness of the fetish.  
 
Affective media’s political potential is dialectical in both channelling drive and affect in 
complex circuits of capital and in creating antagonistic divisions which are 
preconditions for the political. Just as not every division is political, with populism, a 
form of pseudo-politics3, not every affect is fetishistic. Where the pleasures of 
communication approach the fetish is in the logic of jouissance. Jouissance is the 
obscene enjoyment or transgression licensed by the fetish that is caught in the fear 
and loathing of the other in populism. Jouissance relies upon the ridicule of the 
other, affirming the populist community, while the other’s own enjoyment 
represents jouissance stolen from the community (Žižek 1997, 43). As both the 
source of enjoyment and a constant threat, the other becomes an object of 
obsession and a contradictory amalgam of evils. It’s easy to see how the pursuit of 
jouissance as an end in itself, with no higher emancipatory potential, corresponds to 
the sociality of affective media. Trolling is exemplary in its obsession with the online 
presence of the other, whether a political or personal enemy, and the public 
mocking and ridicule of this other. Some theorists have turned to the hacker group 
Anonymous as example of sublimation of the affective drive for “LULZ” into ‘the 
pursuit of a rational political goal’ (Stoehrel and Lindgren 2014, 257). Whatever acts 
of resistance are produced through affective pleasures, the relation of this drive to 
the object is essential. As Lacan states ‘sublimate as much as you like; you will have 
to pay for it with something and that something is called jouissance’ (1992, 332). In 
the case of populism engendered by affective media, subjects “do it for the LULZ” in 
sustaining an overdetermined enemy as a target of derision and source of jouissance.  
 
Glenn Beck’s Affective Community 
 
So far I have considered Beck at this macro level of instrumentality for Fox. In order 
to understand what is properly affective and political in his performance it’s 
necessary to enter the micro level of text. The texts selected are key episodes from 
Beck’s oeuvre during his stint on Fox from 2009-11. While the program itself was a 
tireless campaign against Obama, these episodes represent key inflection points that 
articulate the audience as movement and programming as revolutionary education. 
These include his creation of the 9/12 movement, the passage of healthcare reform, 
his three-part series on George Soros and key chalkboard expositions which are 
regularly featured in the Beck universe. 
 
This analysis is not concerned with authorship or reception as Beck may well be a 
self-conscious charlatan and audiences range from true believers to masochistic 
liberals. The selected episodes of the Beck program are treated as texts that bear 
the political and libidinal logic of affective media. I stress what precisely these texts 
do. The circulation of affects in media space doesn’t, in itself, produce new political 
subjectivities, rather elicits inner-psychic elements of desire and antagonism. The 
point of the analysis is not to track outlandish conspiracies but to understand how 
the performance and content correspond to the populist logics of the friend/enemy 
grouping, the overdetermined outsider, fetishism, jouissance and the populist claim 
to the universal. Beck’s program is prescriptive, in terms of his didacticism and in the 
way it imagines social transformation, in and through, affective media.  
 
Early in his tenure at Fox, Beck announced his unique populist routine to the world 
with his Tea Party-inspired 9/12 Project. The project attempted to solicit free 
labour, monetized by Beck and Fox, through an affective invitation to the populist 
lifeworld and jouissance. Invoking the overdetermined spectre of 9/11 as a metaphor 
for the populist’s existential struggle, Beck’s community is overwrought by fear, love 
and a narcissistic sense of its place in history. Beck’s discourse of transformation 
through affective media practices culminated in a march on Washington on 
September 12th 2009 and countless other pseudo-political events. Rather than 
reconcile individualism and collectivism Beck mobilizes a collective of insular libidinal 
energies in the service of libertarianism.  
 
The 9/12 launch was crafted as a spectacle embodying the light and dark, love and 
loathing, and friend/enemy groupings that define the populist lifeworld. The show 
begins with Beck backstage announcing, ‘I’m going to show you that you aren’t alone’ 
(2009a). What follows is a lurid video fusing the threats of Mexican drug cartels, 
terrorism, Unions, Wall St, high corporate tax rates, foreign corporations and 
Washington DC, juxtaposed to Tea Party people who ‘just know what is right’ and 
have made America ‘the world’s beacon of freedom’ (ibid). The last image shows 
two men in the aftermath of 9/11 hugging, rocking and crying as affective affirmation 
of populist brotherhood. The video concludes cutting to Beck, backstage, fighting 
back tears and urging his audience to ‘remember who you were that day after 9/11’. 
This affective assault on the senses sets up the promise of the fetish as a “hug-it-out” 
fraternity and an emotional break-down analogous to evangelical rebirth, that 
simultaneously licenses wild fantasies of the enemy. 
 
From this backstage space of darkness, Beck emerges in a choreographed emotional 
rise, with cued audience applause and a brightly-lit talk-show set, to declare ‘we 
aren’t alone’. Beck proceeds to detail the reach of his audience community from the 
studio, to Chuck Norris’ ranch, military bases, bars and churches in ‘virtually every 
small town and big city in this great nation’. Beck’s claim to stand as the historical 
agent of “Real America”, what Laclau describes in populism as the plebs claim as 
populous (2005, 86), is secured by pandering to his audience in a manner 
symptomatic of affective media production. Standing in front of a mural of social 
media images of his viewers to read “We The People” [figure 1], Beck offers a 
mawkish version of affective media transformation:  
 
The mosaic proves that a single photo is just a face…but thousands of 
them grouped together in the right way can create something much 
more powerful 
While this appropriation of the rhizome has no traces of Deleuzian poetry it speaks 
to the malleability of affective media discourses. Affective media production makes 
promises to both the populist fetishist and the multitude while reinforcing neo-liberal 
individuation and a political reward structure of narcissism and jouissance.  
 
Figure 1: The Launch of Beck’s 9/12 Project (2009a) 
The apogee of this affective movement discourse is articulated in a moment which 
provided fodder for late-night comics. Tearfully overcome by the support of his 
audience, he claims the 9/12 project proves that ‘the real power to change America 
lies with you, you are the secret, you are the answer’. It’s hard to think of a more 
contrived moment of affective sincerity than Beck’s tearful entreaties to his 
audience’s narcissism. Beck’s tears are an invitation to the community and they 
cement a fetishistic solidarity through the performative ritual of religious testimony4. 
It’s instructive of how affect works within fetishistic libidinal circuits. These tears 
aren’t external productive energy but entirely insular, appealing to the fetishist’s 
unfulfilled desire. In this sense, Beck’s tears work at the level of symbolic efficiency. 
Jodi Dean (2010b) advances the notion that drive in affective media thrives on the 
decline of symbolic efficiency or the collapse of meaning. Disparate individualized 
channels of communication have a debilitating effect on political organization and 
lead to endless discussions, misrecognition and taxonomical identity politics. 
Conversely Beck’s insular fetishistic community precisely embodies the symbolic 
efficiency and the logic of the political that is possible in affective media production.   
The return of symbolic efficiency allows Beck to marry a discourse of rhizomatic 
individualism with a fetishistic uniformity of opinion, from the over-enthusiastic 
nodding of the studio audience to panelists exalting Beck as a prophet. Beck and the 
9/12 committee can even profess an intense concern for co-optation, process and 
individualism (2010a) that belies a community wholly reconciled in the fetish. Beck 
aligns his movements with post-hierarchical politics and the chair of 9/12 describes 
their organization as:  
truly grassroots, just like capitalism. If you don’t have people at the top 
giving orders it gives people the freedom to make decisions and use their 
creativity (2010a).  
 
This statement perfectly captures Beck’s logic of affective media production. It 
creates the illusion of a non-hirearchical capitalism made possible by the Tea Party 
fetish of capitalism as a primordial wholeness. The affective investment in this fetish 
and the “creative freedoms” of followers allows Beck to exploit this labour and 
conflate his avarice and profit with virtue. 
 
The Ominpotent Enemy 
In affectively cementing a community in fetishism it’s necessary to demarcate the 
antagonistic enemy as both a threat and source of enjoyment. This enemy of the 
people becomes an object of obsessive “revolutionary” study, producing its own 
circular conspiratorial enjoyment. For the populist the enemy is over-determined by 
a raft of contradictory evils all deriving from their own excessive enjoyment which 
threatens the people. Fittingly the Obama-as-Joker meme became widely circulated 
at Tea Party events and social media. The joker is a figure of obscene jouissance 
whose enjoyment is based on collapsing the people’s order and morality, and yet he 
possesses ‘no ideological agenda except to overturn order and incite chaos’ 
(Acherman, 9). The spectral figure of the enemy ‘condenses around itself a plurality 
of meanings’ (Laclau 2005, 22), Obama and Soros simultaneously represent the 
lumpenproletariat and the financial elite, are incompetent yet omnipotent, masters of 
Machivellian dark arts and amoral rascals. The enemy’s omnipotence is rendered in 
terms of jouissance and sexual pathology in an episode devoted entirely to the 
theory that the Obama administration represents the high point of Bernaysian 
libidinal mastery (2011). In one of Beck’s recurrent chalkboard expositions, the 
“Timeline of Communism”, he includes key dates such as 1848 (Communist 
Manifesto), 1871 (Paris Commune) and 2000 when super-model Gisele wore a bikini 
featuring the post-modern image of Che Guevara (2010c) [figure 2]. There is no 
irony intended in Beck’s statement. This “event” is seen as a material demonstration 




Figure 2: Beck’s “Timeline of Communism” (2010c) 
 
The height of this over-determined and anti-semitic 5  discourse of the enemy 
occurred in Beck’s three-part series on Soros entitled The Puppet Master. The 
opening credits feature puppeteers pulling strings with the names of Soros’ various 
philanthropic institutions but also the street sign ‘Wall St’ [figures 3 and 4]. In a 
precise rendering of the fascist rhetoric of financial parasitism, Beck imagines Soros, 
the hedge-fund manager and liberal philanthropist, running a shadow-world 
government with functionaries like Obama. The pathological figure Beck casts is 
necessary to sustain the fetishistic belief in American capitalism, treating hedge funds 
as abnormal. Beck asks rhetorically: ‘Is it a coincidence that everything under the sun 
when it comes to capitalism is targeted for regulation by congress except for hedge 
funds?’ (2010g). As with anti-Semitic denunciations of finance, the critique of 
capitalism is replaced with an obscene enemy perverting the system. Soros did play a 
devastating role in the East-Asian financial crisis of the 1990s, but Beck doesn’t 
attribute this to financial class power but Soros’ insatiable jouissance. Beck explains: 
‘he loves turning countries inside out and upside down. He got hooked on it, he has 
to feed the addiction’ (ibid). Having already denounced Soros as a self-hating Nazi 
collaborator (2010f) Beck invokes the classic figure of anti-semitism--the vampire--to 
describe Soros as an ‘economic war criminal who sucks the blood of people’ 
(2010g). In this scenario the Tea Party are the Christian virgin threatened with 




Figures 3 and 4: Beck’s three part series on George Soros entitled “The Puppet Master” 
(2010e) 
 
In his broadcast after the passage of the Affordable Care Act (2010b), Beck 
elaborated upon this parasitic network of stolen jouissance. Beck’s exposition 
conforms neatly with Žižek’s classification of the ‘inauthentic fundamentalist’ (2001, 
68) whose obsession with the other’s jouissance is an acting-out of their own inner 
turmoil. Beck characterizes the Obama/Soros apparatus as ‘California hippy Marxist 
socialist communist progressive, sticking flowers in the barrel [sic], sitting around 
smoking dope during college…I bet you a lot of them are still doing it.’ (2010b). This 
jouissance is linked specifically to political efficacy as the Democrats are both ‘dirty 
spineless weasels’ and ‘ruthless, morally bankrupt and the ends-justify-the-means Saul 
Alinskyites…[who] will do anything including eat their own’ (ibid). There is no 
paradox here as the overdetermined enemy is “ruthless” by virtue of being 
“spineless” slaves to their passions. At one point in his healthcare monologue, Beck 
demands: ‘Tell me Barack Obama what were you doing? What were you doing when 
you were going to college, who were you hanging out with?’ (2010b). Constructing 
Obama as a cipher, or jouissance personified, allows him to stand in for multiple 
excesses embodying the libertarian paranoiac view of the masses as simultaneously a 
force for communism and fascism. He is at once a libertine of the 1960s counter-
culture, the terror of a mobilized African-American lumpenproletariat and a ruthless 
autocrat. 
 
What is central to these wild claims of Obama and Soros’ network of jouissance is 
an affective solicitation to the insular world of the fetish. Beck’s claims are validated 
by an ineffable sense of stolen enjoyment and victimization. Where this converges 
with affective media practices is in the circuits of outrage, obsession and trolling as a 
source of jouissance made possible by the superfluousness of tweets, memes and 
youtube clips. In the same monologue, Beck further unpacks this obscene network of 
solipsistic radicals, transitioning to who he describes as ‘the real bulk of [Obama’s] 
army’ (2010b). Beck then proceeds to play a recording made by a right-wing radio 
host who interviewed African-American residents from Detroit applying to a federal 
anti-homelessness program The clip is completely decontextualized but serves as 
“proof” of the enemies rapaciousness by reference to the fetishist imaginary:  
 
Reporter: Why are you here? 
Women: To get some money. 
Reporter: What kind of money? 
Women: Obama money. 
Reporter: Where’s it coming from? 
Women: Obama. 
Reporter: Where did Obama get it? 
Women: I don’t know his stash [laughing]. I don’t know. I don’t know 
where he got it from, but he givin’  it to us to help us, and we love him. 
Women: That’s why we voted for him.  
[children chanting: Obama! Obama!] (ibid) 
 
The racist imaginary here is unrestrained; hordes of inner-city blacks on welfare and 
Regan’s specter of unmarried “Welfare Queens” having children. Their jouissance is 
dependent upon the enemy’s obscene alliance of elites and the poor who deprive the 
people of their enjoyment and virtuous toil through progressive taxation. In the 
world of the Tea Party fetish, there is no disconnect between this racism and the 
claim to stand for King and the civil rights movement as they resist the Obama 




The affective sociality of Beck’s audience is clearly not the rhizomatic realization of a 
latent multitude. Rather than the reconciliation of individualism and the collective, 
these affective encounters possess an ontology of fetishist individuation and a 
communal structure of jouissance. In spite of these reactionary politics, Beck 
instrumentalizes affective media’s notion of critical universality. Beck’s audience 
imagine themselves engaging in transformative social practices6 prefiguring a new 
universalist millenarian community. Populist ontology depends upon a discourse of 
universality, and a victimized people with exclusive access to a radical “truth”. The 
populists are imbued with the universal, or as Thomas Jefferson declared of the 
frontier yeoman, they are ‘the chosen people of god…whose breasts he has made 
his peculiar deposit for substantial and genuine virtue’ (1975, 217). The Tea Party’s 
fetishistic worship of the founders and the constitution is important here as it 
bridges bourgeois enlightenment with the affective validity claims of the community. 
In this way, Beck models himself as a modern day Thomas Paine ‘daring to ask 
reasonable questions in unreasonable times’ (2009b). 
 
Beck’s affective performance adopts the classical rhetoric of ‘parrhessia’ (Foucault 
2001); a form of plain-speaking demonstrating ‘the courage to speak the truth in 
spite of some danger’ (ibid, 16). While the modern Cartesian subject of 
enlightenment arrives at truth through a self-critical process of ‘evidential 
experience’, the parrhessiaste’s truth is guaranteed by ‘moral qualities’ (ibid, 14-15) 
of courage and sincerity. Beck’s claim to truth-telling is validated by the affective 
baring of his soul and his vulnerabilities. What is unique is Beck’s attempt to wed a 
populist epistemology to the universalism of enlightenment rationalism. As 
Hofstader’s classic study of anti-communist extremism describes, these movements 
are ‘intensely rationalistic’ (1965, 36), built by the pseudo-scholarship of anti-
intellectual intellectuals. Thus, Beck’s chalkboard expositions, the stable of right-wing 
public intellectuals he relies upon and the Beck University subscription service 
provide the semblance of academic rigor in a self-referential populist universe where 
the drive for “truth” is merely a function of enjoyment and jouissance.  
 
Key to the role of the parrhesiaste is describing the personal journey which has 
brought Beck to his awakening. Mirroring the language of evangelical redemption and 
revolutionary conceptions of political awakening, the truth deracinates. In one of the 
episodes where Beck outlines the communist/progressive plot, he reveals his own 
disbelief as validating this unimpeachable truth. The episode features an interview 
with a revisionist historian about his book rehabilitating Joseph McCarthy: 
 
I picked up this book about 2-3 years ago…I put it down and the reason 
why I put it down is, I don’t want to believe this. I don’t want to believe 
it. I put it down and went, “I’m not ready to hear that”, “I can’t handle 
that”. Please America, please read this book (2010c). 
 
This “truth” is not arrived at through self-reflexivity but is affectively validated in the 
loop of pain and jouissance that is fetishized identity. Yet Beck appeals to seemingly 
rationalist practices and disavows the closed logic of his populist epistemology. In his 
truth-telling mode he continually urges:  ‘Don’t just listen to me but do your own 
homework, research yourself, this is far too important’ (2010e), directing viewers to 
his own website as a primary source (2010f). Beck assigns scholarly weight to his 
chalkboard expositions as if this requires careful unpacking rather than simply 
affective identification. Introducing his series of broadcasts on Soros, Beck urged his 
audience: ‘We are trying to get through a very difficult problem in a short period of 
time I ask that you VCR or DVR every episode this week’ (2010e). Where this 
echoes a critical media sensibility is in the logic of radical enlightenment, as Beck 
claims his “truth” is arming the people ‘with the most powerful weapon you have, 
information you need’ (2010f). 
 
 
Figure 5: Beck’s “personal story” (2010e) 
 
Central to Beck’s shtick and the affective logic of the program is his role as the 
tortured parrhesiaste. Beneath the surface of every program lies an anguish and 
suffering that the truth inflicts upon him.  Speaking to Alveida King before his rally to 
claim the mantle of Martin Luther King, Beck spoke of facing down the perceived 
threat of violence from the likes of the New Black Panther party by ‘link[ing] arms 
and sing[ing] a hymn’ (2010d). He regularly forcasts his martyrdom since leaving Fox, 
however this formula was crystallized in his series on Soros. At the end of Beck’s 
first breathless program on Soros, he transitions from his chalkboard/professorial 
context to a part of his set which has been transformed to appear like his sitting 
room [figure 5]. Adorned with Americana, this sanctum of populist lifeworld is 
where Beck reveals the cost of truth stating: ‘There is a personal story we need to 
share with you’ (2010e). He proceeds to explain how a representative of Soros’ 
reached out to Beck to request a meeting. The representative is described as wild 
and out of control demanding Beck cease his attacks on Soros. When Beck’s 
producer stood firm on the validity of Beck’s claims Soros’ representative is 
described as offering a clear threat:  
 
He looked at my executive and said, “I don’t think you hear me”, “I don’t 
think you understand. Glenn Beck is hurting Mr Soros and his business” 
(ibid).  
 
This “threat” looms large over the next two episodes as Beck accepts the 
consequences for his truth-telling as he resolves that: ‘as long as I have breath I will 
always speak what I think is the truth’ (ibid).  
 
While resolved to this fate, Beck slips from tranquility to anguish as if simply serving 
as the medium for a truth which is more powerful than his own frail humanity. In the 
final Soros episode, Beck shifts to unbridled apocalypticism entreating his audience 
to embrace this painful truth:  
 
Look I know that soon, soon, the gates of hell [headrocking for emphasis] 
are going to be opened up...It’s time to take a stand! You have to take a 
stand because my children and your children’s freedom is at stake 
(2010g). 
 
Beck’s affective performance of sincerity and sacrifice are used to show the 
indisputable nature of his claims. In signing off from the program Beck performs a 
self-aggrandizing gesture that suggests that this act might be his last stating that: ‘I’d 
like to be remembered for three things. Question with boldness, hold to truth, 
speak without fear’ (ibid). Whether Beck believes this or not is irrelevant, this 
performance of parrhesia allows his community to experience themselves as the 




Beck is exemplary of affective media production; his show and media empire rely 
upon the exploitation of personal affective moments and expounding an ideal of 
social transformation. His audience are a loyal army consuming his media ventures, 
reading lists and end-times commodities; while simultaneously experiencing a form of 
social collaboration and rebellion. It would seem antithetical to boosters of affective 
media that Beck’s audience could embody the values of the rhizome, however Beck 
marries this notion of social transformation with a communal structure of 
individuation and jouissance. The labour of Beck’s audience is affective but it doesn’t 
exceed capitalism as malleable social ideals of autonomy are appropriated into 
circuits of drive. In fact, Beck achieves something quite remarkable in imaging his 
movement of private property fetishists as the digital multitude. Against Hardt and 
Negri’s teleology of affective labour, there is nothing innately critical about the 
sociality of Beck’s audience. Their affective energies aren’t productive beyond a 
fetishistic outburst of antagonism which simply reaffirms jouissance and populist 
desire. Put simply, affect doesn’t short circuit the political work of ideology and 
organization through a humanist uniting of bodies in media space. 
 
Beck’s followers aren’t merely polarized, a concern common of normative liberal 
communication studies, but embody the populist logic of the political. Here affective 
media production engenders the political as the signifier “Tea Party” emerges as an 
object of radical investment. This signifier is overdetermined, replacing a holistic 
ideal of the social reconciled in private property, a people of boundless virtue and a 
rapacious enemy responsible for the theft of the people’s jouissance. Beck’s 
emotional performance is an affective invitation to the movement with communal 
solidarity and warmth cemented by the vicious dehumanization of the enemy. Where 
social media politics has generally meant the ‘decline of symbolic efficiency’ (Dean 
2010b, 5), the eruption of an antagonistic fetishistic populism is the kind of symbolic 
efficiency possible in affective media. Beck’s audience aren’t prone to the endless 
discussions aimed at clarifying their political lexicon, as is characteristic of left social 
media. The fetish and affective validation are shortcuts to meaning. When Beck 
sheds tears he is appealing to the insular libidinal energies of the populist who simply 
know Beck is right by virtue of their own affective investments.  
 
Beck’s Tea Party populism clearly doesn’t approach emancipatory politics, rather it’s 
caught an incessant drive for jouissance, pursued as its own end and never fully 
attained. Beck and his audience are obsessed with their enemy, imagined as an 
omnipotent amalgamation of contradictory evils and personal pathologies of 
jouissance. Soros is “addicted” to destroying countries, Obama is a pot-smoking 
campus Marxist and inner-city African Americans are having children out of wedlock. 
While populism calls for the enemy’s destruction, this enemy cannot be transcended 
as they are necessary to enjoy the fetish of the reconciled community. In a manner 
analogous to anti-semitism, it’s the very presence of the Jew/enemy that sustains the 
myth of the social whole and licenses a transgressive jouissance. Beck and the Tea 
Party can consequently imagine themselves as inheritors of the civil rights legacy 
while engaging in vile attacks on the black working-class.  
 
Beck’s impact on American political discourse has been profound, not simply in the 
popularization and dissemination of his conspiracies but in the semblance of radical 
critique. In many ways, affective media politics may resemble the political at a formal 
level, yet this is void of critical potential as with Beck’s “community” of individuation 
or parrhesia sans critique. It’s not enough to say that affective media production co-
opts social energies and diverts political potential, an epistemological drive is built-in 
as a pre-condition for the exploitation of affective labour. In his role as parrhesiaste, 
Beck panders to his audiences’ sense of radical knowingness and persecution. They 
imagine the omnipotent enemy as an existential threat;  shared experience of this 
perceived vulnerability function as proof-positive that the people have access to a 
critical “truth” and represent the universal will of history. This populist knowledge 
assumes a radical emancipatory quality similar to other forms of “truth will out” 
politics; from Alex Jones and 9/11 Truthers to the hacker politics of Anonymous. In 
the affective subsumption of the universal, this pseudo-critical knowledge regularly 
devolves into depoliticized-libertarian notions of power and politics in which the 
people are encircled by both fascists and communists. What should be clear from 
this case study is that a critical media politics will not simply arise by virtue of the 
social characteristics of affective media production as contemporary media relies 
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1 There is no better demonstration of this than the emergence of Donald Trump as 
force of pure jouissance untethered from the discipline of Fox, the party and its 
donors. 
2 Forbes (2014) magazine listed Beck’s 2014 earnings at $90 million dollars, second 
only to Howard Stern, but more than Oprah, Ellen Degeneres and Rush Limbaugh. 
3 While the concept of the political as ontologically necessary is useful I would hold 
that the distinction between authentic political rupture and populism would be a 
project which delineates an enemy in ethico-political terms rather than the fetishist 
imaginary. 
4 The chair of the 9/12 project spoke of the power of Beck’s word as evidenced by 
her uncontrollable weeping upon hearing Beck on his radio program (Beck 2010d).  
5 Beck’s anti-semitism is deceptive as he simultaneously associates Soros with anti-
semitic tropes while holding Israel and conservative Jews in the highest esteem. This 
is more than just the evangelical enthusiasm for Israel as part of an end-times 
scenario. This deep solidarity with the state of Israel allows Tea Partiers to indulge in 
notions of persecution analogous to the Jews and anti-Semitism. 
6 Whether radical education, survivalist agricultural production or the exchange of 
metallic currency all are based on an “off-the-grid” social alternative. Of course all of 
these “alternative” models of social relations are directly monetized by Beck. 
